Peace with Israel will not be on the way. Hezbollah might still be receiving weapons freely. Western businessmen will not be building new hotels. Cultural delegations will not be heading to the United States. Islamists may gain a foothold.
So much for the optimistic scenario of the outcome of the street revolutions now gripping and spreading throughout President Bashar el-Assad’s Syria. Despite now daily protests increasingly met with violent military response by snipers, tanks and occupation troops, Assad remains in control. He is, of course, following the example set by dad – the late Hafez – who in 1982 killed about 15,000 or so people in Hama (which is in revolt again) by simply surrounding it with artillery and nearly destroying the whole town.
That example held up well for nearly 30 years, but a combination of factors has led to this Assad’s government slowly losing control: The inspiration of the “Arab Spring,” the increasing importance of the Internet/cell phones in spreading information (which means government loss of controlling public information), and continually failed economic reforms that have worsened the quality of life (meaning the people increasingly feel they have nothing to lose, including their lives).
There are three scenarios that could ultimately occur:
*Assad, who has already signaled that he is willing to murder thousands of civilians, could stay in power with the backing of his military. If he can calm the situation, his torture jails again will fill with dissidents and he will brutalize seeds of political opposition.
*Assad could be forced out by that same military, which will take over just as Turkey’s brass did in the 1970s. The results of this scenario remain unknown. One way to gauge it, however, is realize that those military chiefs will not turn to the west for their weapons.
*Assad and his cronies will be forced out, leaving the country in a state of disarray and anarchy (which is potentially very bad for Israel and the west). That would occur because, unlike in Libya, the Syrian rebels have no power structure or control of limited territory to begin learning the hard work of governing. Nor do they have the air power protection of western forces. So that leaves the country open to the influence of Iran and others.
While this last case scenario – Assad and his military cronies being bumped out – is the most favorable one to the West, this is the Middle East and often you want to joust with the devil you do know.
But that realpolitik scenario seems increasingly unlikely, which means we should prepare for a long, tumultuous transition that will have numerous ups and downs. Managing it will be critical and, let’s face it, the West (led by the United States) does not have the best track record in that regard this past decade.
What we do know is the longer this drags out, the more organized the rebels will become, which is good. Whether they can hold out remains a huge unknown. But, tragically, the more people Assad’s forces kill, the more sympathizers the rebels will gain. A key moment will arrive when and if – as happened in Libya – certain military commanders go to the rebels.
Meanwhile, it’s all up to the Syrian people. The country has no oil or important industry (other than harboring terrorists and having Damascus International Airport be a conduit for weapons to Hezbollah). And with western troops bogged down in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, sanctions and angry words are the best the west will do (which it did yesterday. See http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/eu-slaps-sanctions-on-more-syria-officials-italy-recalls-its-damascus-ambassador-1.376572 ).
Stay tuned.

