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The Croatia Summit is South East Europe’s premier event held each July in Dubrovnik. The Summit provides an essential forum to address regional, wider-European and international issues and brings together European leaders, regional heads of state, foreign ministers, defense ministers, policy experts to discuss and examine key issues confronting the region, Croatia, wider Europe and the world.
The Republic of Croatia is not only a strong regional leader but is also a key NATO ally and is expected to become a member of the European Union (EU) in early 2011. It is also a nation that suffered tremendously during the war that consumed the Balkans, more specifically, the republics comprising the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990’s.
Yet, in a little more than a decade Croatia is setting the example not only to its fellow former Republics, but also to other nations in the world as to how to rebuild and succeed on the international level.
As a participant of the Croatia Summit since nearly its inception, it is easier for me to chart Croatia’s and the Summit’s trajectory and importance. Each year brings new challenges and issues, Croatia uses the Summit to address them in an open forum, and each of the participating nations has an opportunity to address the Summit.
It was heartening to see the leadership of Kosovo participate and regrettable to learn of Serbia’s boycott of the Summit due to Kosovo’s participation. One of the recurrent topics of discussion was the forthcoming decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral Declaration of Independence of 17 February 2008. President Thaci told us that he hoped that the court’s decision would encourage other nations, including the remaining European nations to recognize Kosovo and that while it looks forward to a constructive dialogue with Serbia; Kosovo’s independence is not up for discussion. The decision was expected on July 22 this year.
To fully appreciate the ICJ’s decision some background on Kosovo is important. Kosovo, comprised of predominantly ethnic Albanians was a semi-autonomous region that took its turn alongside the republics in the rotating presidency of Yugoslavia, much like the rotating EU presidency of today. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic delivered a nationalistic speech in Kosovo Polije on the 500th anniversary of the Battle of the Blackbirds when the Serbs fought a loosing battle against the Ottomans. This speech was the end of Kosovo’s autonomy and marked the beginnings of a decade long war.
In 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 to ensure the interim administration of Kosovo. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo or UNMIK was charged with overseeing Kosovo. The final status of Kosovo was to be worked out between Kosovo and Serbia. Between
1999 and the unilateral declaration of independence the parties failed to find a negotiated solution. In 2005, Norwegian UN Permanent Representative Kai Eide was appointed Special representative by UN Secretary General and performed a comprehensive review of Kosovo. Former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari was charged with coming up with plan for Kosovo’s future. Despite the Ahtisaari plan, final status negotiations failed and the people of Kosovo seized the opportunity and unilaterally declared its independence on 17 February 2008.
On July 22, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its long-awaited advisory opinion on the narrow question of whether Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence violated international law. The court sidestepped the question of the legitimacy of Kosovo’s statehood under international law or if the recognition by 69 of the 192 UN member nations of the UN, including most of Europe and the United States violated international law.
In its opinion, the court touched on these questions and reasoned that if the UNGA wanted an advisory opinion on them, it would have asked the court to address them.
While the United States and 68 other nations recognized Kosovo’s independence, Serbia, China, Russia and others challenged the legality of the declaration. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) referred the matter to the ICJ. However, the issue presented to the court was not on the legality of Kosovo’s statehood or its recognition by the United States and others, but on the question of the unilateral declaration itself.
The ICJ’s process unfolded in three parts. The court devoted almost half of the decision to the issue of its jurisdiction and held unanimously that it had jurisdiction. On the second part as to whether the court should provide an advisory opinion the court voted 9-5 to take up the matter and on the question presented to it in held 10-4 that the Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law or the legal interpretation of UNSC Resolution 1244.
While an advisory opinion is non-binding and the ICJ only addressed the narrow question of the unilateral declaration of independence, the global significance and consequences are far reaching. In addition to numerous secessionist movements around the world, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were the causus belli of the 2008 Russo-Georgia war, the decision presents a challenge for Israel and the Middle East.
What happens when the Palestinian Authority whose status was recently upgraded in Washington, D.C., and Europe uses the ICJ Kosovo advisory opinion as its new “road map,” declares its unilateral independence and Russia, Serbia and China and others recognize an independent Palestine, leaving aside whether it satisfies the requirements for statehood under international law.
Questions that we must be prepared for include: What will this do to the elusive Middle East peace process and how does the United States, Europe, Israel, the quartet and the international community deal with a Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence?
Matthew Mark Horn, who writes from Mt. Washington, is the former co-executive director of the American Jewish Congress. He also has served as Special Assistant for International Security Affairs (ISA) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs).
REPRESSION AND VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO AND
KOSOVO: THE HUMANITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
TWO HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 18, 1998 AND JUNE 25, 1998
Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE 105-2-1 AND 106-2-2] and reprinted by permission of the author.
MEMORANDUM: KOSOVA’S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
To: Hon. Joseph DioGuardi, President, Albanian American Civic League; Shirley A. Cloyes, Balkan Affairs Adviser, Albanian Ameri¬can Civic League
From: Matthew Mark Horn, JD
Date: 24 June 1998
You have asked me to look at international law to assess the case that the Albanians of Kosova can make for independence from the repressive Serbian regime headed by Slobodan Milosevic. My pre¬liminary analysis of Kosova’s right to independence under interna¬tional law is outlined below. For the purposes of this analysis, seces¬sion means independence.
Much has been written about the international legal principle of self-determination1, and it is well established in international law as opinio juris2 and as one noted international legal scholar stated, ``[a] minority within a state, especially if it occupies discrete territory, may have a fight to secede—roughly analogous to a decolonization fight—if it is persistently and egregiously denied political and social equality as well as the opportunity to retain its cultural identity.’‘3 Furthermore, ``severe deprivations of human fights often leave no alternative to territorial separation.’‘4 Such is the problem today con-fronting the people of Kosova, and as stated above, not only does in¬ternational law recognize a fight to secede under certain circum¬stances, but numerous international legal scholars hold that under certain circumstances, it is justified.
In reviewing a plethora of articles and books on the subject of self-determination, the authorities hold, generally, that a right to secede is not automatic or guaranteed; that the exercise of self-determina¬tion means internal self-determination; that under certain circum¬stances secession may be warranted, and that a blanket rejection of the right to secede is improper.
In addition, legal authorities hold, generally, that certain criteria must be satisfied before a claim for secession may be granted. The criteria are: (1) identifying the group claiming the fight of self-deter¬mination5, and (a) what right is it6; (2) what is the nature and scope of their claim7; (3) what are the reasons behind the groups’ claim8; and (4) the degree of the deprivation of basic human rights.9 The criteria encompass both objective and subjective elements.10 The objective cri¬teria are: a common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history, and cultural heritage.11 Another important objective factor is the defined groups territory.12 The subjective criteria, to what extent do the individuals within the group perceive themselves collectively as a ``people.’‘13 Lastly, the degree which the group seeking self-de¬termination can form a viable political group.14
The above criteria will be analyzed under the particular conditions that are unique to Kosova, and the viability of the Kosovar Albanians’ self-determination movement for secession is apparent. Before we analyze the criteria, it is essential that the documents conferring the right of self-determination are examined. These documents show, that if a government is not complying with the letter, spirit and interpre¬tation of the instruments, then such violation may remove the im¬pediments for secession to occur.
1. BASIS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
The history of self-determination traces its roots to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.15 President Wilson proclaimed the concept to the League of Nations in 191916, yet the principal did not become part of international instruments until the United Nations in the 1950’s.17 In the 1960’s, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo¬nial Countries and Peoples, stated, ``all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their po¬litical status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.18 However, self-determination in the Declaration was aimed solely at decolonization, and contained a clause prohibiting the disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a state.19
The following are relevant to the Kosova situation. In the 1970 the General Assembly unanimously adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations. One of the prin¬ciples in the Declaration is the principle of ``equal fights and self-determination’ of peoples, stating, ``all peoples have the fight freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to respect this fight in accordance with the provi¬sions of the Charter.’‘20
The state owes a duty under the Declaration towards a people claim¬ing the right of self-determination:
to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples ... of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are en-titled to seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
Stated above, is the duty that states owe to one another, in their peoples (collective) self-determination. You will see that a state seek¬ing protection ``must be possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction to race, creed or color.’’ The key here is ``government representing the whole people, `` in the absence of compliance with the aforementioned, a government is in violation of and therefore is not entitled to protec¬tion from ``any action which would dismember or impair ... [its] terri¬torial integrity or political unity.21 In the Kosova situation, the Bel-grade Government through its application of ten years of martial law, freezing and taking away of the rights of the Kosovar’s, solely be-cause of their ethnicity, violates the Declaration, and therefore, as logic follows, the Milosevic regime should not expect its territorial integrity to be protected. To look at it another way, a state that does not have a government that represents all the people, has impliedly waived its fight to territorial integrity, and as such has no fight to seek international protection from secession. In Milosevic’s case, the Kosovar’s fight for freedom resulting from the Serbs’ protracted bar¬barity, should be assessed in terms of self-defense. On the other hand, the actions of the Serbs against the Kosovar Albanians, must be looked at under the General Assembly’s definition of aggression.
[N]othing in this Definition could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration particularly peoples under colonial rule, and racist regimes nor the right of these, peoples to struggle to that end and receive support in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above mentioned Declaration.22
While, the Declarations and other instruments were looked at in the context of colonial rule, the principles and rights, that United Nations sought to protect, remain the same, whether a colony or re¬pressive regime. In the case of Kosova, the logical interpretation of the right to receive support must be construed as the international community recognizing the Kosovar Albanians legitimate right of Self-determination, i.e., secession. Furthermore, one only needs to open a newspaper, watch a press conference to hear senior government offi¬cials speak about Milosevic’s regime of hate, ``ethnic cleansing,’’ bru¬tality and repression. Another kind of support is the international community’s recognizing that Milosevic’s actions violate the peace and security of the region as set forth in the Charter, and acts accord¬ingly.
The UN instruments provides the framework to support a viable claim for self-determination in a post-colonial world, where repres¬sive regimes, such as Milosevic’s are tantamount to neo-colonial re¬pression.
II. ELEMENTS SETTING FORTH THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS
PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
In order to legitimate the claim for self-determination (the exter¬nal self-determination of secession), several criteria must be satis¬fied.
Who is the identifying group claiming the right of self-determina¬tion? In the Kosova situation it is the more than 1.8 million people living in the Kosova region of Serbia out of approximately 2 million people that are seeking to have this right enforced as independence. For the other objective elements, the Kosovar Albanians (the 1. 8 million of the population) share the common language of Albanian; the group are descendants from the Illyrians, the first group to in-habit the Balkans, they share the same ethnicity, and are generally describes as ``ethnic Albanians’‘; share a common history in the Bal¬kans, and, in particular, the Kosova region; and share a common cul¬tural identity as ethnic Albanians with an historic bond to the region.
In terms of the subjective holdings of the Kosovar Albanians, their desire to secede is predicated on the principles of self rule, and is exhibited in their collective overwhelming belief in that they are a people and a nation of Kosovar Albanians. These beliefs are held by the entire group, as represented to the world, by the Kosovar Albanian’s elected leader Dr. Rugova. The group further manifests its desire to re-gain its self-rule in the form of independence. The group was quite successful at managing its own affairs when it had full political autonomy equal to full republic status within the former Yugoslavia. A fact further bolstering the position of the Kosovars’ belief in their own self-government and rule is that they had their own banks, police force, hospitals, schools and government, before Milosevic came to power23 and stripped them of their fights. In addi¬tion to Dr. Rugova, the Kosovar Albanians have a government -in-exile (that term is used generically, based on what the Kosovars refer to its leadership abroad).
What right of self-determination are the Kosovar Albanian’s seek¬ing? In the case of Kosova, the right that the Kosovar Albanians are seeking is secession, i.e., independence. It is of paramount importance, to separate the sui generis situation of Kosova from the rest of the self-determination movements. Until 1989, when then Serbian Presi¬dent Milosevic, stripped the autonomy from Kosova, in violation of the Constitution; Kosova was an autonomous entity with the political status equal to the other six republics within the Federal Republic. The equal status meant that a Kosovar Albanian headed the Federal Republic as part of the rotating presidency.
To re-hash history and specific events, while important, is not the purpose of this paper, but it is significant to note that since its incep¬tion, Kosova and its people have suffered and were subjected to the brutal whim of those in power, while lacking the independent ‘legal’ status to be afforded international protection.24 From that vantage point, to go into an analysis of looking at the situation in terms of ‘internal’ self-determination is not helpful, but a necessary step in proving Kosova’s right to independence. Internal self-determination, defined as, the fight of a people ``to choose its political allegiance, to influence the political order under which it lives, and to preserve its cultural, ethnic and historical identity,25 in most instances would be sufficient.
For nearly ten years, under the repressive Milosevic regime, the Kosovars had no say in their governance, were abused, stripped of any semblance of basic human rights and dignity. According to Hu-man Rights Watch Helsinki Kosova is a ``society run by brute force and intimidation, where the rule of law has completely disintegrated.26 Over the past three years, the situation has deteriorated to the hor¬rific level of violence that began in March 1998 and has resulted in death, destruction, rape, and other reported violations, that when verified by UN and international authorities, will result in indict¬ments by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo¬slavia. Based on the aforementioned, it is impossible for the Kosovar Albanians to envision internal self-determination as a viable or ac¬ceptable option. One authority describes the rationale behind inter¬nal self-determination as a way of preserving the rights of the peoples, in a way where the international community can intervene in a dis¬pute, before it becomes so serious that a people demands an indepen¬dent state.27 I contend that the facts and recent history of a besieged Kosova dictate that the window for resolution short of independence, has been slammed shut and bolted down.
What is the nature and scope of their claim? This approach encom¬passes many of the same issues discussed above, and the reasons the Kosovar Albanians need their independence. The nature and scope of the claim and what are the reasons of the claim are tied together, and will also be addressed in the heading, ``the degree of deprivation of basic human rights.’’ The answer to the questions posited are simple, acts of aggression are committed upon the Kosovars on a daily basis over a protracted period of time. Professor Nanda, states, ``there must be little hope that any action short of separation would satisfy the sub-group’s (Kosovars) desire for effective participation in the value process.’‘28 All the elements are examined, including the ``impact upon the state, the surrounding region, or the international community.29 Professor Suzuki uses a test of reasonableness in order to ascertain what is best for all, taking all issues into consideration.30
At first blush, the natural response is to say, notwithstanding all the horrors that the Kosovar Albanians were subjected to over the years, including March 1998 to the present day, to allow the self-determination to move forward would be to destabilize the fragile peace in the region. Yet, without the Peacekeepers in Bosnia, there is no peace. So it is difficult to ascertain whether the situation under IFOR is confidence building towards sustainable peace, or if once the troops leave the region will fall apart. What we do know is that there is an ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia, Montenegro and else where in the region. To reject a claim to self-determination because a threat or fears of perceived threats causing tremors throughout the international community is not a reason to categorically reject move¬ments for external self-determination.31
There were several instances when the international community, aware of the threat Milosevic posed to the people of Kosova, by his actions and deeds overlooked the situation and sought no remedy. One author stated, ``Dayton, like the inter war guarantees, has force in only limited geographic areas. Because the purpose of Dayton was limited to ending the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the agreement does not mention other troubled lands in the former Yu¬goslavia, including the ethnic Albanian land of Kosovo. Contrary to their practice of negotiating with all the leaders with power—regard¬less of whether they are duly elected leaders of recognized states— the Dayton negotiating team did not deal with Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Kosova Albanians, the fourth largest group in the former Yugoslavia.’‘32 Professor Mertus further states, ``Kosovo, like Mace¬donia, was seen as simply irrelevant to Dayton’s limited goal of im¬mediate cessation of hostilities. Yet Kosova played a central role in the destruction of Yugoslavia and it continues to play a major role in the destabilization of the region.’‘33 At the Balkan summit in Dayton, Ohio, a State Department spokesman said that it was ``too compli¬cated’’ to explain why Kosova was excluded from the talks.’‘34 To add insult to injury, the Republic of Srpska was created at Dayton as a separate legal entity, by operation of an agreement between the par-ties. Without playing the Monday morning quarterback, it is evident that had Rugova and the Kosova question been addressed at Dayton, there might just have been a different outcome.
With the aforementioned in mind, one must take another look at all the factors in the region, and as volatile as the situation is, it was the international community that left the Kosovar Albanians out in the cold. To answer the reasonableness question, it is reasonable based on the totality of the issues that the Kosovar Albanians’ self-determi¬nation movement proceed.
Without getting bogged down in minutia and super specifics of the Kosovar-Serb relationship, it is fair to say that the Kosovar Alba¬nians have a claim or nexus to the region. This is not the basic legal question of a first year law student, as to who owns Balckacre. This is a question as to is there a recognizable geographical area that the Kosovars are tied to. The answer is yes. Kosova was an autonomous entity and had equal rights and an equal vote in the Federal Repub¬lic, before being stripped of its autonomy by Milosevic. To address the political component as to whether Kosova could function as an inde¬pendent entity, one need look no further than to the Kosova that had an equal role in the Republic, along with its own leaders, schools, hospitals, police force etc. Furthermore, Dr. Rugova is recognized to-day by heads of state, as the elected leader of the Kosovar Albanians.
The final element is the issue of human rights. The human rights test is defined as ``to what extent a group suffers subjugation, domi¬nation and exploitation ... and to what extent the individual mem¬bers are deprived of the opportunity to participate in the value pro¬cesses of a body politic because of their group identification.35 Unfortunately, it is difficult to find a place to begin. Certainly in the last ten years, the conditions that the Kosovars were and are sub¬jected to are beyond the pale in terms of analysis. ``Severe depriva¬tions of human rights often leave no alternative to territorial separa¬tion. The world community must respond effectively and efficiently to the consequences of such separation. There is a growing recogni¬tion of the close link between human rights and international peace and security.’‘36
In addition to the current abuses in Kosova, the U.S. Department of State, in its 1997 Serbia-Montenegro Country Report stated, `` The Government’s human rights record continued to be poor. The police committed numerous, serious abuses including extrajudicial killings, torture, brutal beatings and arbitrary arrests. Police repression con¬tinued to be directed against ethnic minorities, and Police committed the most widespread and worst abuses against Kosova’s 90 percent ethnic Albanian population.’‘37 World leaders from the United Nation’s Secretary-General Annan, accused the Serb military and paramili¬tary police of atrocities in Kosova, and that ``they must not be al-lowed to repeat the campaign of ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that characterized the war in Bosnia ... if the world has learned anything from that dire chapter in history, it is that this kind of aggression must be confronted and with determina¬tion.’‘38 These are just a few of the statements that senior officials are stating about the situation in Kosova. Thousands of refugees trekked hundreds of miles on foot to flee the rapes, the murders, the beatings, the plundering and burning of homes and the mass destruction of entire villages in Kosova. Not only does this type of behavior rise to the level of crimes against humanity, it violates all the human fights instruments in force. It is fair to state that the Kosovars have met their burden under the ``human fights deprivations test.
M. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is clear based on the aforementioned that the Kosovar Albanians met the burden of a prima facie case for independence. The next step is how to accomplish that task.
According to some experts in United Nations practice, the Secre¬tary-General pursuant to Article 99, is authorized to bring matters of secession before the Security Council.39 Furthermore, the General Assembly has the secondary competence (after the Security Council) to make appropriate recommendations.40 The United Nations through it various offices could create a group that deals with the specifics of secession, that will avert civil conflict and those rising to the level of a breach of the peace and security. Another possibility is that the international community convenes a committee to redress the wrong, by leaving Kosova out of Dayton. Lastly, if it is within the compe¬tence of the International Court of Justice, an advisory opinion may be sought addressing the issue of Kosovo’s independence.
What is clear is that based on what the experts hold as the essen¬tial criteria in order to satisfy a claim of secession; Kosova met its burden—and the international community should take the appropri¬ate steps. It is not just the issue of rectifying a wrong to Kosova, but the creation of a mechanism that prevents future Kosovas. Unless the question of Kosova’s independence is legitimately addressed, a lasting peace in the Balkans is unlikely.
ENDNOTES
1 See e.g., Ved Nanda, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination: Revisiting Self-Determination as an international Law Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era, 3 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 443 (1997), Note 1.
2 See, Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AJIL 304 (1994), citing, Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AJIL 146 (1987), note 21.
3 Id. at 307, citing, Thomas Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law 3, 130914 (Catherine Brolmann, Rene Lefeber & Marjoleine Zieck eds., 1993)
4 Nanda, supra note 1, at 443.
5 Ved Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Valid¬ity of Claims to Secede, 13 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 257, 275 (1981).
6 Id. at 275.
7 Id. at 275.
8 Id. at 275.
9 Id. at 275.
10 Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right of Self-Determination, 10 Conn. J. Int’l L. 153, 161 (1994).
11 Id. at 16 1.
12 Id. at 161, citing, Lea Brilmayer, Succession and Self-Determina¬tion: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J. Int’l L 177, 17809179 (1991), ``[w]ithout a persuasive claim over a geographical territory, a people’s assertion of their external right to self-determination is se¬verely undermined, especially if the group is seeking independence.
13 Id. at 16 1, citing, Michael C. van Walt van Praag, Population Transfer and the Survival of the Tibetan Identity 34 (1988).
14 Id. at 161, citing, supra, note 13.
15 See Nanda, supra, note I for a history of self-determination.
16 See generally, Micaela Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (1976).
17 Supra note I at 448
18 Id. at 448.
19 Id. at 448. 20 Nanda, supra note 5 at 269.
21 Nanda, supra note 5 at 271.
22 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.31) 142 U.N. Doc. A/ 9631 (1974)
23 See Frederick B. Baer, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 243, 25209257 (1996)
24 24 ``In 199 1, the country of Yugoslavia began to fracture into sepa¬rate nations. Operating under the pretext of maintaining Yugoslav integrity, Serbian dominated JV army attacked first Slovenia, and then Croatia. In April 1992, in the hope of securing international pro¬tection, Bosnia declared its independence, which was rejected by many Bosnian Serbs.’’ WELCOME TO SARAJEVO, M. Michaelson.
25 Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, IO Conn. J. Int’l L. 15 3, 162.(1994).
26 Frederick B. Baer, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 243, 253, quoting, Justin Burke, Ethnic Shock Waves Crash at Albania’s Border, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 22, 1995, at 6.
27 Kolodner, Supra note 23 at 162.
28 Ved Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Valid¬ity of Claims to Secede, 13 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 257, 277 (1981).
29 Id. at 276.
30 Id. at 27609277, citing, Reisman & Suzuki, Recognition of Social Change: A Prologue for Decision Making, Toward a World Order and Human Dignity, 403, 81309820 (1973).
31 Kolodner, supra note 23 at 159.
32 Julie Mertus, Prospects for National Minorities Under Dayton
Accords—Lessons From History: The Inter-Wars Minorities Schemes
and the ``Yugoslav Nations,’’ 23 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 793, 827 (1998).
33 Id. at 827.
34 Frederick B. Baer, Intermatonal Refugees as Political Weapons, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 243, 254 (1996).
35 Nanda, supra note 5 at 27809279.
36 Nanda, supra note I at 44309445.
37 Human Rights Country Report, U.S. Department of State, Wash¬ington, D.C. (1997) at 2.
38 Reuters, June 8, 1997.
39 Nanda, supra note 5 at 279.
40 Nanda, supra note 5 at 279