Op/Ed
print
July 4, 2008
Behind The Gaza Ceasefire
Dr. Robert O. Freedman
Special to the Jewish Times
The recent ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, agreed to by Israel’s politically besieged Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, appears to be a tactical, if not a strategic, setback for Israel.
In return for Hamas not firing or allowing rockets and mortars to be fired into Israel, Israel agreed not to attack Gaza and to gradually open the border crossings between Israel and Gaza so more goods could enter the Hamas-controlled region.
Yet the fact that within a week of the ceasefire an Islamic Jihad team fired rockets into Israel, and soon after so did the Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade, raises questions about the ability, let alone the will, of Hamas to stop the attacks.
Indeed, after the first attack, a Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya asserted that while Hamas would not itself’fire rockets at Israel, it wouldn’t stop others, including the Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad, from doing so.
After the second attack, with Israeli leaders such as Foreign Minister Tzippy Livni and Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer threatening retaliation, and Israel closing the border crossings (since reopened), Hamas appeared to change its tune. A Hamas spokesman condemned the attacks as hurting the Palestinian “national interest,” and Hamas promised to take action to stop them. Whether it will do so remains to be seen.
There is, however, a larger issue at stake. By signing a ceasefire with Hamas, Israel has legitimized a terrorist organization that continues to proclaim Israel’s destruction as its goal. Thus several European states, which have been toying with the idea of establishing ties with Hamas, may now be encouraged to do so. Even more serious, Fatah and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas, who has been considering re-establishing relations with Hamas — relations ruptured after Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007 — may now feel more able to do so, without requiring Hamas to recognize Israel, as Israel itself has had formal dealings with the organization.
The ceasefire thus was a diplomatic victory for Hamas, which received a respite from Israeli attacks, got Israel to lift its severe blockade of Gaza (thus enhancing its position among the hard-pressed Gazan population) and demonstrated it could still fight Israel by allowing other groups to attack the Jewish State. All that came without diplomatic concessions or agreeing to international demands to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist.
If the errors of the deal are so evident, why did Olmert agree to it, other than to give respite to Israelis in Sderot and other Israeli communities under rocket attack? Cynics argue that Olmert’s recent flurry of regional peace moves — the ceasefire, the Hezbollah prisoner exchange (which might lead to Olmert’s proposed talks with Lebanon) and his initiation of negotiations with Syria — are the desperate moves of a weakened political leader seeking to avoid being ousted on corruption charges. This, the cynics say, is done by fostering the peace process, much as Olmert’s predecessor, Sharon, did with his ill-fated 2005 Gaza withdrawal plan.
Analysts more sympathetic to Olmert speculate that his moves are linked to a strategy of pacifying Israel’s borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Syria before an expected Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
There is, however, a third explanation. With Israeli elections on the horizon, now likely in 2009, one year ahead of schedule, Olmert still hopes to lead his Kadima Party, which has a primary scheduled for September. So he wishes to portray himself as a centrist leader.
Thus, on the one hand he has yet to make serious concessions to the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. The Jewish settlements there continue to expand, very few Israeli security checkpoints limiting Palestinian movement have been removed and the Israeli army remains in tight control.
Through this tough position on the West Bank, Olmert hopes to appeal to Israel’s political right-wing by demonstrating that he has stood firm in the region most vital to Israeli security. On the other hand, through his willingness to negotiate with Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, he is trying to convince Israel’s political left-wing that he is genuinely pursuing the peace process.
Whether this strategy will work is a very open question, and Olmert may very well lose in the Kadima primary. While the wily Israeli leader did survive the Winograd Report which detailed the failures of his government during the 2006 Lebanese War, it appears that his days in office are limited and the questionable Gaza ceasefire may not help him remain prime minister for much longer. ••
Dr. Robert O. Freedman is Visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. Among his many publications are “Israel’s First Fifty Years” and the soon-to-be published “Contemporary Israel: Israeli Political, Economic and Strategic Challenges Since Rabin” (Westview Press in August 2008).