Op/Ed
February 15, 2008
Beyond Winograd
Dr. Robert O. Freedman
Special to the Jewish Times
The questions as to whether Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert can move the peace process forward towards a two-state solution, the obstacles he faces and the support he enjoys, and how Israel can settle “final status” issues without crossing any “red lines,” are all important ones. Yet they all hinge on the question of whether Olmert’s coalition government can stay in power, and how long.
The primary alternative to Olmert, former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, is likely to freeze the peace process by not permitting further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank, thus preventing the contiguous Palestinian state that Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas has been demanding. Fortunately for Olmert, the Winograd Commission, which analyzed the 2006 Israeli war with Hezbollah, appears to have given his government a new lease on life. While the Winograd report did not exonerate Olmert, it refuted the charge that he sent the Israeli army into southern Lebanon at the end of the war unnecessarily. With Olmert politically strengthened by the report, Defense Minister Ehud Barak chose not to pull his Labor Party out of the coalition. In part, Barak based his decision on the need to reform the IDF, which was scathingly criticized by the Winograd Commission, as well as to prepare it to meet the challenges of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.
In part, however, considering post-Winograd Israeli public opinion polls, Barak did not get the bounce he was looking for. A related cause for Barak’s decision to stay in the government, despite an earlier pledge to pull Labor out after the publication of the final Winograd report, was that the polls predicted a major victory for Netanyahu if elections were held in the near future.
A second key member of the coalition, Shas, the Sephardic Ultra-Orthodox Religious Party, also decided to stay in the government. In part, this was due to Olmert’s statement that he would hold off on any discussions on the future of Jerusalem until much later in the negotiations, and in part because Shas was given control of the newly-reconstituted Ministry of Religious Services, a prime source of patronage jobs. Nonetheless, if Olmert is indeed serious about the peace process, at some point Jerusalem will have to be discussed.
While Meretz, with its five Knesset seats, would most likely support the government from the outside if the peace process was on track, a number of Meretz members of Knesset are calling for Olmert to resign, while others oppose such a move. The splits in Meretz are unlikely to be resolved until the election of a new Meretz leader in March. It is sometimes speculated that the three Arab parties — Hadash, Balad and the United Arab List — would also support the government if Shas pulled out. This overlooks the fact that the Arab parties have become highly estranged from the Olmert government, and Israeli society over the past few years.
In looking at the obstacles confronting Olmert, one must start with Barak. It is not yet clear how aggressively Barak will push to dismantle the illegal settlement outposts on the West Bank, or whether he will ever allow Fatah forces to police the West Bank. Since Barak wants to return as prime minister, he cannot afford to appear weak on the Palestinian issue. This is the case because Netanyahu has argued that the withdrawals from southern Lebanon (under Barak) and Gaza have led to disasters.
The strongest opposition to Olmert’s plan for a two-state solution will come from the so-called “Hilltop Youth,” children of the Religious Zionists who settled the West Bank in the 1970s and 1980s. The largest group of Israelis opposing further withdrawals may be called “security pragmatists,” individuals who oppose further withdrawals from the West Bank. This group forms the bedrock of Netanyahu’s support.
In sum, given the current balance of forces in Israeli politics, it is difficult to imagine a peace agreement can be reached before President Bush leaves office. At the minimum, if Barak can be persuaded to uproot the “illegal outposts,” if the U.S. makes a major effort to train the Fatah military, and if progress can be made on establishing the borders of the new Palestinian state, there will be momentum toward peace that the next American president can build on.