Op/Ed
May 2, 2008
Russia’s Ruse
Dr. Robert O. Freedman
Special to the Jewish Times
In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been actively working to arrange an Arab-Israeli peace conference in Moscow. While Mr. Putin has sought to entice both Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli leader Ehud Olmert to attend the conference by hinting that Hamas would not be invited, holding a Middle East peace conference in Moscow before there is a major change in Russia’s Middle East policy would be a serious mistake.
Russia has been pushing to hold an international peace conference on the Middle East since 2005 when Mr. Putin began Russia’s current political offensive in the region. This offensive has included stepped-up arms sales to anti-Israeli countries like Syria and Iran, cultivation of Middle Eastern terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah (neither of which is on Russia’s official list of terrorist organizations) and diplomatic visits by Mr. Putin to a number of countries in the Middle East, including Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.
Mr. Putin has three goals in his Middle East strategy. The first is to “show the flag,” to demonstrate that Russia is again playing a major role in the region, as Moscow did during the Soviet era. The second goal is to sell arms and other high-tech products such as nuclear reactors to Middle Eastern countries. The third is to gain access to Middle Eastern oil and natural gas reserves, because Russia’s production of these energy commodities has begun to drop.
While one can certainly understand Mr. Putin’s desire to hold an Arab-Israeli peace conference in Moscow, not only would it be the continuation of his effort to demonstrate that Moscow is again a major player in the Middle East but it would also show Russia’s diplomatic equality with the United States (which recently held such a conference in Annapolis).
But there is no reason why either Israel or the United States should reward Moscow by attending the conference until there is a major change in Russian policy in the Middle East. Indeed, by selling highly sophisticated arms to Iran, a country whose leaders have been calling for Israel’s destruction, and also by protecting Iran from serious sanctions by the United Nations Security Council because of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program, Russia has shown that it is not really an advocate of peace.
Second, Russian support of Hamas and Hezbollah, which also have the goal of destroying Israel, is hard to equate with the pursuit of peace. Finally, Russian arms sales to Syria, as well as its diplomatic support for that country, which is the most belligerent of Israel’s Arab neighbors, also doesn’t demonstrate a genuine interest in peace.
What then could Moscow do to qualify to hold a Middle Eastern peace conference? First, it could cut arms sales to Iran if the Iranian leadership refused to stop its nuclear enrichment program. Second, Moscow could tell Hamas that unless it dropped its call for the destruction of Israel, Russia would terminate all diplomatic contact with it. Merely promising not to invite Hamas to the proposed Middle East conference is not enough.
Finally, Moscow could pressure Syria — by threatening to cut arms sales to that country — to drop its condition for talks with Israel on Israel’s first agreeing to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights.
Unless Russia takes these actions, which would reflect a major change in its Middle Eastern policy, both Israel and the United States should strongly oppose holding an Arab- Israeli peace conference in Moscow, because Mr. Putin’s Russia is currently not a genuine partner for peace in the region.