Op/Ed
print
September 5, 2008
Strike Iran Sooner
Dr. Robert O. Freedman
Special to the Jewish Times
In recent months, a growing gap has become evident between the United States and Israel on policy toward Iran. While the Bush administration seems increasingly reluctant to use force to stop the rapidly expanding Iranian nuclear program, the vast majority of Israelis — who see a mortal threat — increasingly support such an attack, especially on the centrifuge plant at Natanz, the heavy-water reactor being constructed at Arak and the nuclear reactor being constructed, with Russia’s help, at Bushehr.
Two factors have intensified Israeli concern:
• Despite occasional denials, Iran appears to be receiving the long-range SAM-300 anti-missile system from Russia, with their installation around nuclear sites expected to be completed between as early as March 2009. Once these missiles are operational, an Israeli air attack will be much more difficult.
• Second, the recent deterioration of Russian-American relations because of Russia’s invasion of Georgia makes serious U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran even less likely.
Iran has announced that it already has installed 4,000 centrifuges at Natanz (3,000 are deemed sufficient to build a nuclear weapon), and installing 3,000 more, with the eventual goal of more than 50,000. Simultaneously, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the leading proponent of a nuclear Iran, continues to call for Israel’s destruction.
Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad claims a mystical connection to the last Shia Imam, Mohamed al-Mahdi, and appears to believe that a cataclysmic event, such as a nuclear war with Israel, could bring the imam’s return to earth.
Ahmadinejad does not hold the top post in Iran, but the person who does — Supreme Religious Leader The Ayatollah Khameini –– just endorsed him for reelection. The endorsement most likely means an Ahmadinejad victory in the Spring 2009 presidential elections.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly stated that diplomacy, not military action, is the preferred means of dealing with Iran — overlooking the total failure until now of such activity. In June both the U.S. National Intelligence Director and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited Israel and reportedly said that Iran could not yet build a nuclear weapon and, in any case, an Israeli attack would “damage U.S. national interests.”
Their main arguments:
• An attack would retard, and not eliminate, the Iranian program, because many of the installations are hidden;
• It would rally public support around the unpopular Ahmadinejad regime;
• It would have “unpredictable consequences”;
• and it would undermine U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan and threaten U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf.
The first three arguments are weak, if not specious. After several decades of work in Iran, if anyone knows where Iran’s secret installations are it is Israel’s Mossad. Consequently, an Israeli strike could deal a long-lasting blow — far longer than the two months to two years reportedly cited by the United States.
Second, with Khameini’s backing Ahmadinejad, Iranian public opinion doesn’t really matter as Khameini can fix the election.
The “unpredictable consequences” argument is equally problematic. This usually means that Iran will close the Straits of Hormuz, causing oil prices to skyrocket. But if a U.S.-Iranian confrontation is inevitable — I believe it is — then Iran must be confronted before it obtains nuclear weapons. A non-nuclear Iran could close the Straits of Hormuz for days or weeks at the most; a nuclear Iran could close them indefinitely.
Finally, the argument that an Israeli attack could harm U.S. interests carries more weight. Iran has unquestionable influence in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and its missiles can hit U.S. bases in both. Iranian aid to Iraqi Shia forces could complicate the improving military situation there and delay the transfer of U.S. troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. Iran also could complicate the intensifying conflict between NATO and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Yet if Iran plays these cards — it is already smuggling weapons and instructors into Iraq — the U.S. could attack Iranian Revolutionary Guard bases, which send Iranian military equipment into Iraq. And if Iran fires missiles at U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, the United States could strike a major blow at military bases throughout Iran, reducing that country’s ability to further threaten U.S. allies in the region.
Such a response, far from rallying the Iranian population around its regime, might bring its demise.
So despite the growing gap between the U.S. and Israel on this issue, whether such an attack will cause a major crisis between the allies remains very open.
Dr. Robert O. Freedman is Visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. Among his recent publications are: “Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record” and the just published “Contemporary Israel: Political, Economic and Strategic Challenges.”