The idea of dividing Gaza into two zones — an eastern sector under Israeli control and a western sector still under Hamas — is no one’s preferred outcome. It’s not clean, just, or permanent. But after a grueling war, a fragile cease-fire and no credible alternative, it may be the least bad option available. In a conflict defined by the absence of good choices, sometimes the least bad is the only way forward.
At present, Israel controls about 58% of Gaza, mostly in the east, while Hamas remains entrenched in the more densely populated west. The line is not a border, but a cease-fire demarcation born of battlefield realities. For Israel, the eastern zone provides a crucial security buffer and leverage: Hamas is kept at a distance, cross-border attacks become harder and pressure points remain in place for future negotiations.
For Palestinians, the east could offer a fragile but real lifeline. If rubble is cleared, tunnels are destroyed and basic services are restored, it could become the first functioning part of postwar Gaza. Donors are far more likely to invest in an area not run by Hamas, and aid agencies would finally have a chance to deliver assistance without diversion. Over time, “East Gaza” might allow residents to rebuild their lives outside the grip of a terrorist regime and create a model for reconstruction.
But partition carries enormous risks. It could harden Hamas’ control over the west, turning half the enclave into a repressive, stagnant zone while the east limps along as a quasi-protectorate. Cease-fire lines in this region have a way of becoming borders, and if that happens, Israel could find itself indefinitely responsible for an entity it has no desire to govern. The humanitarian and security burdens would be heavy and enduring.
Politics inside Israel add another layer of complexity. Elements of the settler movement have made no secret of their desire to return to Gaza, injecting volatility into an already fragile arrangement. Whether settlers are ultimately permitted to move in will depend on Israeli political decisions — and could ignite fierce domestic and international backlash. Any such move would almost certainly chill donor support and make outside involvement more difficult.
Governance remains unresolved. Israel has said it does not want to permanently rule Gaza. Some envision an interim administration supported by regional or international partners, perhaps with limited Palestinian participation. Others imagine Israel maintaining security control while outsourcing civilian affairs. None of these options are simple, and each carries long-term costs and moral trade-offs.
The test will come over time. If “East Gaza” develops while Hamas presides over an impoverished west, Gazans themselves may make their preferences clear. Given a choice between Hamas rule and life with electricity, jobs and services, many will choose the latter — and that could weaken Hamas more effectively than another round of war.
This is not a good solution. It is an improvised structure built out of necessity. But in the absence of better options, it may provide breathing space: a way to contain Hamas, ease suffering and lay a fragile foundation for something better. The challenge is to ensure this line becomes not an ending, but a beginning.
